We investigate the problem of reasoning in the propositional fragment of MBNF, the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure introduced by Lifschitz, which can be considered as a unifying framework for several nonmonotonic formalisms, including default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, epistemic queries, and logic programming. We characterize the complexity and provide algorithms for reasoning in propositional MBNF. In particular, we show that skeptical entailment in propositional MBNF is p 3 -complete, hence it is harder than reasoning in all the above mentioned propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. We also prove the exact correspondence between negation as failure in MBNF and negative introspection in Moore's autoepistemic logic.
Introduction
Research in the formalization of commonsense reasoning has pointed out the need of formalizing agents able to reason introspectively about their own knowledge and ignorance (Moore, 1985; Levesque, 1990) . Modal epistemic logics have thus been proposed, in which modalities are interpreted in terms of knowledge or belief. Generally speaking, the conclusions an introspective agent is able to draw depend on both what she knows and what she does not know. Hence, any such conclusion may be retracted when new facts are added to the agent's knowledge. For this reason, many nonmonotonic modal formalisms have been proposed in order to characterize the reasoning abilities of an introspective agent.
Among the nonmonotonic modal logics proposed in the literature, the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure MBNF (Lifschitz, 1991 (Lifschitz, , 1994 ) is one of the most studied formalisms (Chen, 1994; Bochman, 1995; Beringer & Schaub, 1993) . Roughly speaking, such a logic is built by adding to rst-order logic two distinct modalities, a \minimal belief" modality B and a \negation as failure" modality not. The logic thus obtained is characterized in terms of a nice model-theoretic semantics. MBNF has been used in order to give a declarative semantics to very general classes of logic programs (Lifschitz & Woo, 1992; Schwarz & Lifschitz, 1993; Inoue & Sakama, 1994) , which generalize the stable model semantics of negation as failure in logic programming (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1988 . Also, MBNF can be viewed as an extension of the theory of epistemic queries to databases (Reiter, 1990) , which deals with the problem of querying a rst-order database about its own knowledge. Due to its ability of expressing many features of nonmonotonic logics (Lifschitz, 1994; Schwarz & Lifschitz, 1993) , MBNF is generally considered as a unifying framework for several nonmonotonic formalisms, including default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, epistemic queries, and logic programming.
Although several aspects of the logic MBNF have been thoroughly investigated (Schwarz & Lifschitz, 1993; Chen, 1994; Bochman, 1995) , the existing studies concerning the computational properties of MBNF are limited to subclasses of propositional MBNF theories (Inoue & Sakama, 1994) or to a very restricted subset of the rst-order case (Beringer & Schaub, 1993) .
In this paper we present a computational characterization of deduction in the propositional fragment of MBNF. In particular, we show that logical implication in the propositional fragment of MBNF is a p 3 -complete problem: hence, it is harder (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses) than reasoning in all the best known propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning, like autoepistemic logic (Niemel a, 1992; Gottlob, 1992) , default logic (Gottlob, 1992) , circumscription (Eiter & Gottlob, 1993) , (disjunctive) logic programming (Eiter & Gottlob, 1995) , and several McDermott and Doyle's logics (Marek & Truszczy nski, 1993) . As shown in the following, this result also implies that minimal knowledge is computationally harder than negation as failure.
Moreover, we study the subclass of at MBNF theories, i.e. MBNF theories without nested occurrences of modalities, showing that in this case logical implication is p 2 -complete. This case is the most interesting one from the logic programming viewpoint. Indeed, it implies that, under the stable model semantics, increasing the syntax of program rules, by allowing propositional formulas as goals in the rules, does not a ect the worst-case complexity of query answering for disjunctive logic programs with negation as failure.
Furthermore, we provide algorithms for reasoning both in MBNF and in its at fragment, which are optimal with respect to worst-case complexity. Notably, such deductive methods can be considered as generalizations of known methods for reasoning in nonmonotonic formalisms such as default logic, autoepistemic logic, and logic programming under stable model semantics.
We also show that the \negation as failure" modality in MBNF exactly corresponds to negative introspection in autoepistemic logic (Moore, 1985) . This result implies that the logic MBNF can be considered as the \composition" of two epistemic modalities: the \minimal knowledge" operator due to Halpern and Moses (1985) and Moore's autoepistemic operator.
Besides its theoretical interest, we believe that such a computational and epistemological analysis of MBNF has interesting implications for the development of knowledge representation systems with nonmonotonic abilities, since it allows for a better understanding and comparison of the di erent nonmonotonic formalisms captured by MBNF. The interest in de ning deductive methods for MBNF also arises from the fact that such a logic, originally developed as a framework for the comparison of di erent logical approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning, has recently been considered as an attractive knowledge representation formalism. In particular, it has been shown (Donini, Nardi, & Rosati, 1997a ) that the full power of MBNF is necessary in order to logically formalize several features of implemented frame-based knowledge representation systems.
In the following, we rst brie y recall the logic MBNF. In Section 3 we address the relationship between MBNF and Moore's autoepistemic logic. Then, in Section 4 we study the problem of reasoning in propositional MBNF: we rst consider the case of general MBNF theories, then we deal with at MBNF theories. In Section 5 we present the computational characterization of reasoning in MBNF. We conclude in Section 6. This paper is an extended and thoroughly revised version of (Rosati, 1997) .
The Logic MBNF
In this section we brie y recall the logic MBNF (Lifschitz, 1994) , which is a modal logic with two epistemic operators: a \minimal belief" modality B and a \negation as failure" (also called \negation by default") modality not. We use L to denote a xed propositional language built in the usual way from: (i) an alphabet A of propositional symbols; (ii) the symbols true, false; (iii) the propositional connectives _;^; :; . We denote as L M the modal extension of L with the modalities B and not. We say that a formula ' 2 L M has (modal) depth i (with i 0) if each subformula in ' lies within the scope of at most i modalities, and there exists a subformula in ' which lies within the scope of exactly i modalities.
We denote as L S M the set of subjective MBNF formulas, i.e. the subset of formulas from L M in which each occurrence of a propositional symbol lies within the scope of at least one modality, and with L 1 M the set of at MBNF formulas, that is the set of formulas from L M in which each propositional symbol lies within the scope of exactly one modality. We call a modal formula ' from L M positive (resp. negative) if the modality not (resp. B) does not occur in '. L B denotes the set of positive formulas from L M , while L S B denotes the set of positive formulas from L S M .
We now recall the notion of MBNF model. An interpretation is a set of propositional symbols. An MBNF structure is a triple (I; M b ; M n ), where I is an interpretation (also called initial world) and M b ; M n are non-empty sets of interpretations (worlds). Satis ability of a formula in an MBNF structure is de ned inductively as follows:
1. if ' is a propositional symbol, ' is satis ed by (I; M b ; M n ) i ' 2 I; 2. :' is satis ed by (I; M b ; M n ) i ' is not satis ed by (I; M b ; M n ); 3. ' 1^'2 is satis ed by (I; M b ; M n ) i ' 1 is satis ed by (I; M b ; M n ) and ' 2 is satis ed by (I; M b ; M n ); We write (I; M b ; M n ) j = ' to indicate that ' is satis ed by (I; M b ; M n ). We say that a theory L M is satis ed by (I; M b ; M n ) (and write (I; M b ; M n ) j = ) i each formula from is satis ed by (I; M b ; M n ). If ' 2 L S M , then the evaluation of ' is insensitive to the initial interpretation I: thus, in this case we also write (M b ; M n ) j = '. Analogously, if ' 2 L S B , then the evaluation of ' is insensitive both to the initial interpretation I and to the set M n , and we also write M b j = '. If ' 2 L then the evaluation of ' does not depend on the sets M b ; M n , and in this case we write I j = '.
In order to relate MBNF structures to standard interpretation structures in modal logic (i.e. Kripke structures), we remark that, due to the above notion of satis ability, we can consider the sets M b , M n in an MBNF interpretation structure as two distinct universal Kripke structures, i.e. possible-world structures in which each world is connected to all worlds of the structure. In fact, since the accessibility relation in such a structure is universal, without loss of generality it is possible to identify a universal Kripke structure with the set of interpretations contained in it. We recall that the class of universal Kripke structures characterizes the logic S5 (Marek & Truszczy nski, 1993, Theorem 7.52) .
The nonmonotonic character of MBNF is obtained by imposing the following preference semantics over the interpretation structures satisfying a given theory. Reiter's default logic (Lifschitz, 1994) . Also, let = fB bird^not: ies B ies; B birdg.
In a way analogous to the previous case, it can be shown that the only MBNF models for are of the form (I; M), with M = fI : I j = bird^ iesg. Therefore, j = MBNF B ies. As shown by Lifschitz (1994) , corresponds to the default theory (f bird: ies ies g; bird). It turns out that, when restricting to theories composed of subjective positive formulas, MBNF corresponds to the modal logic of minimal knowledge due to Halpern and Moses (1985) , also known as ground nonmonotonic modal logic S5 G (Kaminski, 1991; Donini, Nardi, & Rosati, 1997b) . In fact, S5 G is obtained from modal logic S5 by imposing the following preference order over the universal Kripke structures satisfying a theory 2 L B : M is a model for i M j = and, for each M 0 , if M 0 j = then M 0 6 M (Shoham, 1987) . In fact, it is immediate to see that the MBNF semantics of theories composed of subjective positive formulas corresponds to the above semantics according to S5 Hence, the main di erence between MBNF and S5 G lies in the fact that in S5 G all models are maximal with respect to set containment (or minimal with respect to the objective knowledge which holds in the model), while in MBNF this property is not generally true.
E.g., the theory = fnot married _ B marriedg has two types of models, for each possible choice of the initial world J: (J; M 1 ), where M 1 corresponds to the set of all interpretations (which represents the case in which married is not assumed to hold); and (J; M 2 ), where M 2 = fI : I j = marriedg. Namely, if married is assumed to hold, then forces one to conclude B married: that is, the initial assumption is justi ed by the knowledge derived on the basis of such an assumption (Lin & Shoham, 1992) . We remark that, by Proposition 2.5, the interpretation of the MBNF operator B exactly corresponds to the interpretation of the modality B in S5 G .
Relating MBNF to Autoepistemic Logic
In this section we study the relationship between autoepistemic logic and MBNF. First, we brie y recall Moore's autoepistemic logic (AEL). In order to keep notation to a minimum, we change the language of AEL, using the modality B instead of L. Thus, in the following a formula of AEL is a formula from L B . De nition 3.1 A propositionally consistent set of formulas T L B is a stable expansion Given a theory L B and a formula ' 2 L B , we write j = AEL ' i ' belongs to all the stable expansions of . Each stable expansion T is a stable set according to the following de nition (Stalnaker, 1993 We recall that a stable set T corresponds to a maximal universal Kripke structure M T such that T is the set of formulas satis ed by M T (Marek & Truszczy nski, 1993) . With the term AEL model for we will thus refer to a set of interpretations M whose set of theorems Th(M) corresponds to a stable expansion for in AEL.
Finally, notice that we have adopted the notion of consistent autoepistemic logic (Marek & Truszczy nski, 1993) , i.e. in (1) we do not allow the inconsistent theory T = L B composed of all modal formulas to be a (possible) stable expansion. The results presented in this section can be easily extended to this case (corresponding to Moore's original proposal): however, this requires to slightly change the semantics of MBNF, allowing in De nition 2.1 the empty set of interpretations to be a possible component of MBNF structures.
In the following, we use the term embedding (or translation) to indicate a transformation function ( ) for modal theories. We are interested in nding a faithful embedding (Gottlob, 1995; Schwarz, 1996; Janhunen, 1998) It is already known that AEL theories can be embedded into MBNF theories. In particular, it has been proven (Lin & Shoham, 1992; Schwarz & Truszczy nski, 1994 ) that AEL theories with no nested occurrences of B (called at theories) can be embedded into MBNF; now, since in AEL any theory can be transformed into an equivalent at theory (which has in general size exponential in the size of the initial theory), it follows that any AEL theory can be embedded into MBNF.
However, we now prove a much stronger result: negation as failure in MBNF exactly corresponds to negative introspection in AEL, i.e. AEL's modality :B and MBNF's modality not are semantically equivalent. Hence, such a correspondence is not only limited to modal theories without nested modalities, and induces a polynomial-time embedding of any AEL theory into MBNF. We rst de ne the translation ( ) of modal theories from AEL to MBNF theories.
De nition 3.3 Let ' 2 L B . Then, (') is the MBNF formula obtained from ' by substituting each occurrence of B with :not. Moreover, if L B , then ( ) denotes the MBNF theory fB (')j' 2 g.
We now show that the translation ( ) embeds AEL theories into MBNF. To this aim, we exploit the semantic characterization of AEL de ned by Schwarz (1992) . Roughly speaking, according to such a preference semantics over possible-world structures, an AEL model for is a set of interpretations M satisfying such that, for any interpretation J not contained in M, the pair (J; M) does not satisfy . Formally: Proposition 3.4 (Schwarz, 1992 , Proposition 4.1) Let L B . Then, M is an AEL model for i , for each interpretation I 2 M, (I; M) j = and, for each interpretation J 6 2 M, (J; M) 6 j = .
In the following, we say that an occurrence of a subformula in a formula ' 2 L M is strict if it does not lie within the scope of a modal operator. E.g., let = B'^not(B _ ).
The occurrence of B' in is strict, while the occurrence of B is not strict. For each ' 2 , let ' 00 denote the propositional formula obtained from ' by replacing each strict occurrence of a formula of the form B with true if M j = B and with false otherwise, and let 00 = f' 00 : ' 2 g. Then, suppose there exists an interpretation J such that J j = 00 and J 6 2 M. Then, from the de nition of satis ability in MBNF structures it follows that (J; M) j = , thus contradicting the hypothesis that M is an AEL model for . Hence, M = fI : I j = 00 g. Now suppose that, for some interpretation I, (I; M) is not an MBNF model for ( ). Then, there exists M 0 M such that (M 0 ; M) j = ( ). From the de nition of ( ), it follows that each interpretation in M 0 satis es 00 , and, since M 0 M, there exists J 6 2 M such that J j = 00 . Contradiction. Therefore, (I; M) is an MBNF model for .
We remark that the above theorem could alternatively be proved from the fact that the K-free fragment of the logic MKNF (Lifschitz, 1991 ) is equivalent to AEL, which is stated (although without proof) by Schwarz and Truszczy nski (1994, page 123) , and from the correspondence between MBNF and MKNF (Lifschitz, 1994) .
The previous theorem implies that the interpretation of the modality not in MBNF and of the modal operator in autoepistemic logic are the same. This property extends previous results relating MBNF with AEL (Lin & Shoham, 1992; Schwarz & Lifschitz, 1993; Chen, 1994) , and has interesting consequences both in the logic programming framework and in nonmonotonic reasoning. In particular, since MBNF generalizes the stable model semantics for logic programs (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1988) , the above result strengthens the idea that AEL is the true logic of negation as failure (as interpreted according to the stable model semantics). Moreover, positive theories have the same interpretation both in MBNF and in the logic of minimal knowledge S5 G (Halpern & Moses, 1985) : consequently, the logic MBNF generalizes both Halpern and Moses' S5 G and Moore's AEL.
Reasoning in MBNF
In this section we present algorithms for reasoning in propositional MBNF: in particular, we study the entailment problem in MBNF. From now on, we assume to deal with nite MBNF theories , therefore we refer to a single formula (which corresponds to the conjunction of all the formulas contained in the nite theory ).
Characterizing MBNF Models
We now present a nite characterization of the MBNF models of a formula 2 L M . As in several methods for reasoning in nonmonotonic modal logics (Gottlob, 1992; Marek & Truszczy nski, 1993; Eiter & Gottlob, 1992; Niemel a, 1992; Donini et al., 1997b) , the technique we employ is based on the de nition of a correspondence between the preferred models of a theory and the partitions of the set of modal subformulas of the theory. In fact, such partitions can be used in order to provide a nite characterization of a universal Kripke structure: speci cally, a partition satisfying certain properties identi es a particular universal Kripke structure M, by uniquely determining a propositional theory such that M is the set of all interpretations satisfying such a theory.
We extend such known techniques in order to deal with the preference semantics of MBNF. In particular, we characterize the properties that a partition of modal subformulas of a formula 2 L M must satisfy in order to identify an MBNF model for . In this way, we provide a method that does not rely on a modal logic theorem prover, but reduces the problem of reasoning in a bimodal logic to a number of reasoning problems in propositional logic.
First, we introduce some preliminary de nitions. We call a formula of the form B' or not ', with ' 2 L M , a modal atom. De nition 4.1 Let 2 L M . We call the set of modal atoms occurring in the modal atoms of (and denote such a set as MA( )).
De nition 4.2 Let 2 L M and let (P; N) be a partition of a set of modal atoms. We denote as (P; N) the formula obtained from by substituting each strict occurrence in of a formula in P with true, and each strict occurrence in of a formula in N with false.
Observe that only the occurrences in of modal subformulas which are not within the scope of another modality are replaced; notice also that, if P N contains MA( ), then (P; N) is a propositional formula. In this case, the pair (P; N) identi es a guess on the modal subformulas from , i.e. P contains the modal subformulas of assumed to hold, while N contains the modal subformulas of assumed not to hold.
De nition 4.3 Let 2 L M and let (P; N) be a partition of MA( ). We denote as ob(P; N) the propositional formula ob(P; N) =B '2P '(P; N) Roughly speaking, the propositional formula ob(P; N) represents the \objective knowledge" implied by the guess (P; N) on the formulas of the form B' belonging to P. From the semantic viewpoint, in each structure (I; M; M 0 ) satisfying the guess on the modal atoms given by (P; N), the propositional formula ob(P; N) constrains the interpretations of M, since in each such structure the propositional formula ob(P; N) must be satis ed by each interpretation J 2 M, i.e. J j = ob(P; N). Informally, the above theorem states that each MBNF model for can be associated with a partition (P; N) of the modal atoms of ; moreover, the propositional formula ob(P; N) exactly characterizes the set of interpretations M of an MBNF model (I; M), in the sense that M is the set of all interpretations satisfying ob(P; N). This provides a nite way to describe all MBNF models for .
We now de ne the notion of a partition of a set of modal atoms induced by a pair of propositional formulas.
De nition 4.8 Let 2 L M , ' 1 ; ' 2 2 L. We denote as Prt( ; ' 1 ; ' 2 ) the partition of MA( ) induced by (M 1 ; M 2 ), where M 1 = fI : I j = ' 1 g, M 2 = fI : I j = ' 2 g.
In order to simplify notation, we denote as Prt( ; ') the partition Prt( ; '; '). The following theorem provides a constructive way to build the partition Prt( ; '; ). Theorem 4.9 Let 2 L M , '; 2 L. Let (P; N) be the partition of MA( ) built as follows:
1. start from P = N = ;; 2. for each modal atom B in MA( ) such that (P; N) 2 L, if the propositional formula ' (P; N) is valid, then add B to P, otherwise add B to N; 3. for each modal atom not in MA( ) such that (P; N) 2 L, if the propositional formula (P; N) is not valid, then add not to P, otherwise add not to N; 4. iteratively apply the above rules until P N = MA( ). Then, (P; N) = Prt( ; '; ). The algorithms we present in the following for reasoning in MBNF use the above shown properties of partitions of modal subformulas of a formula , together with additional conditions on such partitions (that vary according to the di erent classes of theories accepted as inputs), in order to identify all the MBNF models for .
As for the entailment problem j = MBNF ', we point out that the occurrences of not in ' are equivalent to occurrences of :B, since in each MBNF model for both modalities in ' are evaluated on the same set of interpretations. Therefore, as in the original formulation of MBNF (Lifschitz, 1994) , we restrict query answering in MBNF to positive formulas. The proof follows immediately from the fact that, by Theorem 4.9, '(ob(P; N)) = '(Prt('; ob(P; N))), and from Lemma 4.6.
We now show that the entailment problem in MBNF is related to the membership problem for stable sets (Gottlob, 1995) , which in turn is related to the notion of (objective) kernel that has been used to characterize stable expansions of autoepistemic theories (Marek & Truszczy nski, 1993 Let M = fI : I j = ob(P; N)g: from the above de nition and De nition 3.2, it follows immediately that ST(ob(P; N)) = Th(M). Therefore, if ' 2 L S B then (I; M; M) j = ' i ' 2 ST(ob(P; N) 
Reasoning in Propositional MBNF
We now de ne a deductive method for reasoning in general propositional MBNF theories. Speci cally, we present the algorithm MBNF-Not-Entails, reported in Figure 1 , for computing entailment in MBNF.
The algorithm exploits the nite characterization of MBNF models given by Theorem 4.7
and an analogous nite characterization, in terms of partitions of MA( ), of all the models relevant for establishing whether a partition (P; N) of MA( ) identi es an MBNF model. The algorithm checks whether there exists a partition (P; N) of MA( ) satisfying the three conditions (a), (b), (c). Intuitively, the partition cannot be self-contradictory (condition (a)): in particular, the condition (P; N) = Prt( ; ob(P; N)) establishes that the objective knowledge implied by the partition (P; N) (that is, the formula ob(P; N)) identi es a set of interpretations M = fI : I j = ob(P; N)g such that (M; M) induces the same partition (P; N) on MA( ). Moreover, the partition must be consistent with and :' satis es the modal atoms in P, while it does not satisfy the modal atoms in N, hence (P; N) = Prt( ; ob(P; N)), thus satisfying condition (a) of the algorithm. Then, since a a^b is not a valid propositional formula, M 6 j = B(a^b), hence :'(ob(P; N)) = :(true _(:b^false)), which is equivalent to false. Therefore, (P; N)^:'(ob(P; N)) is not satis able, thus condition (b) does not hold.
Suppose now that (P; N) = (P 2 ; N 2 ), where P 2 = fB(a _ Bb); not(c _ :d); Bb; B:not bg N 2 = fnot bg Then, (P; N) = true^(true_true)^c (which is equivalent to c), and ob(P; N) = (a_true)b^t rue, which is equivalent to b. Again, it is easy to see that (P; N) = Prt( ; ob(P; N)), thus satisfying condition (a) of the algorithm. Then, since b a^b is not a valid propositional formula, :'(ob(P; N)) = :(false_(:b^false)), which is equivalent to true. Hence, (P; N):
'(ob(P; N)) is equivalent to c, which implies that condition (b) holds. Finally, it is easy to verify that either condition (c1) or condition (c2) holds for each partition of MA( ) di erent from (P 2 ; N 2 ), with the exception of (P 1 ; N 1 ). So let (P 0 ; N 0 ) = (P 1 ; N 1 ): as shown before, ob(P 0 ; N 0 ) is equivalent to a, hence ob(P; N)^:ob(P 0 ; N 0 ) is equivalent to b^:a, therefore condition (c3) holds for (P 0 ; N 0 ) = (P 1 ; N 1 ), which implies that condition (c) holds for (P; N) = (P 2 ; N 2 ). Consequently, MBNF-Not-Entails( ; ') returns true. In fact, the partition (P 2 ; N 2 ) identi es the set of MBNF models for (I; M) such that I is an interpretation satisfying c and M = fI : I j = bg. Each such model does not satisfy the query ': indeed, it can immediately be veri ed that, for each interpretation I, (I; M; M) 6 j = :Bb _ (:b^B(a^b)), since M 6 j = B(a^b) and M j = Bb.
To prove correctness of the algorithm MBNF-Not-Entails we need the following preliminary lemma.
Lemma 4.14 Let 2 L M , and let (P; N) be the partition of MA( ) induced by (M 0 ; M). Let M 00 = fI : I j = ob(P; N)g. Then, (P; N) is the partition induced by (M 00 ; M). We are now ready to prove correctness of the algorithm MBNF-Not-Entails.
Theorem 4.15 Let 2 L M , ' 2 L B . Then, MBNF-Not-Entails( ; ') returns true i 6 j = MBNF '.
Proof.
If part. Suppose 6 j = MBNF '. Then, there exists a pair (I; M) such that (I; M) is an MBNF model for and (I; M; M) 6 j = '. Let (P; N) be the partition of MA( ) induced by (M; M). By Theorem 4.7, M = fI : I j = ob(P; N)g. Therefore, by De nition 4.8, (P; N) = Prt( ; ob(P; N)). Then, since (I; M; M) 6 j = ', by Theorem 4.10 it follows that I 6 j = '(ob(P; N)), and since (I; M; M) j = , by Lemma 4.6 I j = (P; N), therefore I j = (P; N)^:'(ob(P; N)). Now suppose there exists a partition (P 0 ; N 0 ) of MA( ) such that (P 0 ; N 0 ) 6 = (P; N) and none of conditions (c1), (c2), and (c3) holds. Then, since (P 0 ; N 0 ) is satis able, there exists an interpretation J such that J j = (P 0 ; N 0 ), and since (P 0 ; N 0 ) = Prt( ; ob(P 0 ; N 0 ); ob(P; N)), from Lemma 4.6 it follows that there exists an interpretation J such that (J; M 0 ; M) j = , where M 0 = fI : I j = ob(P 0 ; N 0 )g. Then, since condition (c3) does not hold, the propositional formula ob(P; N) ob(P 0 ; N 0 ) is valid, which implies that M 0 M. Now, if M 0 = M, then (P 0 ; N 0 ) would be the partition induced by (M; M), thus contradicting the hypothesis (P 0 ; N 0 ) 6 = (P; N). Hence, M 0 M, and since (J; M 0 ; M) j = , it follows that (I; M) is not an MBNF model for . Contradiction. Consequently, condition (c) in the algorithm holds, therefore MBNF-Not-Entails( ; ') returns true.
Only-if part. Suppose MBNF-Not-Entails( ; ') returns true. Then, there exists a partition (P; N) of MA( ) such that conditions (a), (b), and (c) hold. Let M = fI : I j = ob(P; N)g. Since (P; N) = Prt( ; ob(P; N)), by De nition 4.8 (P; N) is the partition induced by (M; M). And since (P; N)^:'(ob(P; N)) is satis able, it follows that there exists an interpretation I such that I j = (P; N) and I 6 j = '(ob(P; N)), hence, by Lemma 4.6, (I; M; M) j = and (I; M; M) 6 j = '. Now suppose (I; M) is not an MBNF model for . Then, there exists a set M 0 and an interpretation J such that M 0 M and (J; M 0 ; M) j = .
Let (P 0 ; N 0 ) be the partition of MA( ) induced by (M 0 ; M). Since M = fI : I j = ob(P; N)g, it follows that M 0 contains at least one interpretation J which does not satisfy ob(P; N), and since ob(P; N) = V B 2P (P; N), J does not satisfy at least one formula of the form (P; N) such that B 2 P. Therefore, P 0 6 = P, which implies that (P 0 ; N 0 ) 6 = (P; N). Then, since (J; M 0 ; M) j = , by Lemma 4.6 J j = (P 0 ; N 0 ), hence (P 0 ; N 0 ) is satis able. Now let M 00 = fI : I j = ob(P 0 ; N 0 )g. By Lemma 4.14, it follows that (P 0 ; N 0 ) is the partition induced by (M 00 ; M), therefore, by De nition 4.8, (P 0 ; N 0 ) = Prt( ; ob(P 0 ; N 0 ); ob(P; N)). Moreover, since M 0 M, it follows that the propositional formula ob(P; N) ob(P 0 ; N 0 ) is valid, hence the formula ob(P; N)^:ob(P 0 ; N 0 ) is unsatis able. Consequently, (P 0 ; N 0 ) does not satisfy condition (c) in the algorithm, thus contradicting the hypothesis. Therefore, (I; M) is an MBNF model for , and since (I; M; M) 6 j = ', it follows that 6 j = MBNF ', thus proving the thesis.
We point out the fact that the algorithm MBNF-Not-Entails does not rely on a theorem prover for a modal logic: thus, \modal reasoning" is not actually needed for reasoning in MBNF. This is an interesting peculiarity that MBNF shares with other nonmonotonic modal formalisms, like autoepistemic logic (Moore, 1985) or the autoepistemic logic of knowledge (Schwarz, 1991) .
Reasoning in Flat MBNF
We now study reasoning in at MBNF theories. The main reason for taking into account the at fragment of MBNF is the fact that reasoning in many of the best known nonmonotonic formalisms like default logic, circumscription, and logic programming, can be reduced to reasoning in at MBNF theories (Lifschitz, 1994) .
It is known that, if 2 L 1 M and ' 2 L S B , then it is possible to reduce the entailment j = MBNF ' to reasoning in logic S4F MDD , by translating MBNF formulas into unimodal formulas of S4F MDD (Schwarz & Truszczy nski, 1994) . Thus, the procedure for deciding entailment in the logic S4F MDD presented by Marek and Truszczy nski (1993) can be employed for computing the entailment j = MBNF '. In the following we study a more general problem, that is entailment j = MBNF ' in the case 2 L 1 M and ' 2 L B , and present a specialized algorithm for this problem, which is simpler than the more general reasoning method for S4F MDD .
In Figure 2 we report the algorithm Flat-Not-Entails for computing such an entailment.
In the algorithm, P n denotes the subset of modal atoms from P pre xed by the modality not, i.e. P n = fnot : not 2 Pg.
Informally, correctness of the algorithm Flat-Not-Entails is established by the fact that, if 2 L 1 M , then (a), (b), and (c) are necessary and su cient conditions on a partition (P; N) in order to establish whether it is induced by a pair (M; M) such that there exists an MBNF model for of the form (I; M). In particular, condition (c) states that B(ob(P; N)) must be a consequence of (P n ; N) in modal logic S5, 1 since it can be shown that if (P n ; N) B(ob(P; N)) is not valid in S5, then the guess on the modal atoms of the form B' in P is not minimal. We illustrate this fact through the following example. Therefore, the algorithms MBNF-Not-Entails and Flat-Not-Entails only di er in the way in which it is veri ed whether the MBNF structure associated with a partition (P; N) satis es the preference semantics provided by De nition 2.1, which is implemented through condition (c) in both algorithms. In the algorithm MBNF-Not-Entails, a partition is checked against all other partitions of MA( ), while in the algorithm Flat-Not-Entails it is su cient to verify that the partition (P; N) satis es a \local" property. As shown in the next section, such a di erence re ects the di erent computational properties of the entailment problem in the two cases.
In order to establish correctness of the algorithm, we need a preliminary lemma. Moreover, for each modal atom not 2 P, (M 0 ; M) j = not . Therefore, by Lemma 4.6, (M 0 ; M) 6 j = (P n ; N). Now, since 2 L 1 M , (P n ; N) is a at positive formula, hence its satis ability only depends on the structure M 0 , therefore M 0 6 j = (P n ; N).
Conversely, suppose (I; M) is not an MBNF model for , and let (P; N) be the partition induced by (M; M). Then, there exists a set of interpretations M 0 such that M 0 M and (M 0 ; M) j = . As shown before, this implies that the positive formula (P n ; N) is satis ed by M 0 .
As observed in Section 2, the class of universal Kripke structures characterizes modal logic S5. This immediately implies the following property.
Lemma 4.18 A formula ' 2 L S B is valid in S5 i , for each set of interpretations M, the formula :' is not satis ed by M.
Based on the above property, we are now able to prove correctness of the algorithm Flat-Not-Entails. (P; N) ), it follows that M 00 M. Moreover, since 0 2 L B , by Lemma 4.14 it follows that (P 0 ; N 0 ) is the partition induced by (M 00 ; M 00 ), and since M 0 j = 0 and 0 is at, 0 (P 0 ; N 0 ) is equivalent to true, therefore M 00 j = 0 (P 0 ; N 0 ) and, by Lemma 4.6, M 00 j = 0 . On the other hand, since M 00 M, by Lemma 4.17 it follows that M 00 6 j = 0 . Contradiction. Hence, 0 B(ob(P; N)) is valid in S5, consequently condition (c) of the algorithm holds.
Finally, since (I; M; M) 6 j = ' and M = fJ : J j = ob(P; N)g, by Theorem 4.10 it follows that I 6 j = '(ob (P; N) ). Moreover, since (I; M; M) j = , from Lemma 4.6 it follows that I j = (P; N), consequently I j = (P; N)^:'(ob(P; N)), hence the propositional formula (P; N)^:'(ob(P; N)) is satis able. Therefore, conditions (a), (b), and (c) in the algorithm hold, which implies that Flat-Not-Entails( ; ') returns true.
Finally, the previous theorem provides a computational characterization of the logic of grounded knowledge and justi ed assumptions GK (Lin & Shoham, 1992) . In fact, the logic GK can be considered as a syntactic variant of the propositional fragment of MKNF. Therefore, skeptical entailment in GK is p 3 -complete.
Remark. The computational properties of MBNF and its variants relate such formalisms to ground nonmonotonic modal logics (Eiter & Gottlob, 1992; Donini et al., 1997b; Rosati, 1999) . Notably, ground nonmonotonic modal logics share with MBNF the interpretation in terms of minimal knowledge (or minimal belief) of the modality B; speci cally, as already mentioned, the propositional fragment of MBNF can be considered as built upon S5 G by adding a second modality not. Therefore, it turns out that, in the propositional case, adding a \negation by default" modality to the S5 logic of minimal knowledge does not increase the computational complexity of reasoning, while adding a minimal knowledge modality to AEL does increase the complexity of deduction. We can thus summarize as follows: minimal knowledge is computationally harder than negation as failure.
We now study the complexity of entailment for at MBNF theories. First, it is known that, in the case of at MBNF theories and subjective queries, entailment is p 2 -complete: membership in the class p 2 is a consequence of the fact that at MKNF theories can be polynomially embedded into McDermott and Doyle's nonmonotonic modal logic S4F (Schwarz & Truszczy nski, 1994, Proposition 3.2) , whose entailment problem is p 2 -complete (Marek & Truszczy nski, 1993) , while p 2 -hardness follows from the existence of a polynomialtime embedding of propositional default theories into at MBNF theories (Lifschitz, 1994) . Therefore, the following property holds.
Proposition 5.4 Let 2 L 1 M and let ' 2 L S B . Then, the problem of deciding whether j = MBNF ' is p 2 -complete.
As for complexity of entailment of generic queries with respect to at MBNF theories, we analyze the complexity of the algorithm Flat-Not-Entails reported in Figure 2 . As shown before, both condition (a) and condition (b) can be checked through a linear number (with respect to the size of the input) of calls to an NP-oracle. Moreover, validity in modal logic S5 is a coNP-complete problem (Halpern & Moses, 1992) . Hence, each of the conditions in the algorithm can be computed through a number of calls to an oracle for the propositional validity problem which is polynomial in the size of the input, and since the guess of the partition (P; N) of MA( ) requires a nondeterministic choice, it follows that the algorithm runs in p 2 . Therefore, the following property holds.
Theorem 5.5 Let 2 L 1 M and let ' 2 L B . Then, the problem of deciding whether j = MBNF ' is p 2 -complete.
Membership of the problem to the class p 2 is implied by the algorithm Flat-notentails, whereas p 2 -hardness is implied by Proposition 5.4. Hence, the algorithm Flat-Not-Entails is \optimal" in the sense that it matches the lower bound for the entailment problem.
Finally, we remark that the subset of at MBNF theories in conjunctive normal form can be seen as a further extension of the framework of generalized logic programming introduced by Inoue and Sakama (1994) , which in turn is an extension of the disjunctive logic programming framework under the stable model semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991) . Roughly speaking, at MBNF theories in conjunctive normal form correspond to rules of generalized logic programs in which propositional formulas (instead of literals) are allowed as goals. The above computational characterization implies that such an extension of the framework of logic programming under the stable model semantics does not a ect the worstcase complexity of the entailment problem, which is p 2 -complete just like entailment in logic programs with disjunction under the stable model semantics (Eiter & Gottlob, 1995) . Such a result extends analogous properties (Marek, Truszczy nski, & Rajasekar, 1995) to the case of disjunctive logic programs.
Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the problem of reasoning in the propositional fragment of MBNF. The main results presented can be summarized as follows: the negation as failure modality not of MBNF exactly corresponds to negative introspection in AEL. This implies that the logic MBNF can be viewed as the conservative extension of two di erent nonmonotonic modal logics: Halpern and Moses' logic of minimal knowledge S5 G and Moore's AEL; reasoning in the propositional fragment of MBNF lies at the third level of the polynomial hierarchy, hence (unless the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse) reasoning in MBNF is harder than reasoning in the best known propositional nonmonotonic logics, like default logic, autoepistemic logic, and circumscription; we have de ned methods for reasoning in MBNF, which subsume and generalize wellknown nonmonotonic reasoning algorithms used in logic programming (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1991) , default logic (Gottlob, 1992) , and autoepistemic logic (Marek & Truszczy nski, 1993);  we have studied the at fragment of MBNF and its relationship with the logic programming paradigm.
As for the computational aspects of reasoning in MBNF, the results presented in Section 5 prove that one source of complexity is due to the presence of nested occurrences of modalities in the theory, since reasoning in at MBNF is computationally easier than in the general case.
It can be proven that another source of complexity lies in the underlying objective language. In fact, if we consider L 0 to be a tractable fragment of propositional logic, then the complexity of reasoning in the modal language L 0 M built upon L 0 is lower than in the general case. In particular, it is easy to see that, under the assumption that entailment in L 0 can be computed in polynomial time, the algorithm MBNF-Not-Entails provides an upper bound of p 2 for MBNF-entailment in the fragment L 0 M .
One possible development of the present work is towards the analysis of reasoning about minimal belief and negation as failure in a rst-order setting: in particular, it should be interesting to see whether it is possible to extend the techniques developed for the propositional case to a more expressive language. A rst attempt in this direction is reported by Donini et al. (1997a) .
